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THE GHANAIAN ELECTION OF 2016  
AND THE WANING POWER OF INCUMBENCY IN AFRICA 
 
Nic Cheeseman 
Gabrielle Lynch 
Justin Willis 
 
 
On 7 December 2016, Ghanaians went to the polls in a high stakes election that 
tested the country’s democratic credentials. A new Chair of the Electoral Commission 
(EC) faced a baptism of fire, accused of favouring the ruling party but presiding over 
an election that many observers predicted could deliver an opposition victory.1 
Despite two peaceful transfers of power in 2000 and 2008, mounting political 
tensions and concern that the outcome of the election would be disputed led a 
majority of citizens to fear that the polls would be accompanied by violence.2  
 
Just two days later, public apprehension turned to pride as all parties accepted the 
results. This was despite the fact that the ruling party suffered defeat in both the 
presidential and legislative polls. In the former, Nana Akufo Addo of the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) defeated the incumbent, President John Mahama of the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC), winning an absolute majority (54%) in the first round. 
Significantly, this represented the first time a sitting Ghanaian president had been 
defeated at the ballot box, since all previous opposition victories came in contests in 
which the ruling party was forced to run a first time candidate after the incumbent had 
exhausted constitutional term limits and stood down.3  
 
This transfer of power delighted NPP supporters and disappointed their NDC 
counterparts in equal measure, but there appears to have been a broad consensus 
that the process was fair and represented the will of the people.4 Indeed, the 
elections confirmed both the willingness of the electorate to vote out poorly 
performing governments, and the commitment of political elites to play by the rules of 
the game, culminating in another step forwards in what Gyimah-Boadi has called 
Ghana’s fragile process of democratic consolidation.5  
 
Drawing on fieldwork before, during and after the elections,6 we argue that the polls 
also have much to tell us about the state of democracy elsewhere in Africa. To date, 
the advantages of incumbency and the “menu of manipulation” have tended to 
dominate analyses of African elections.7 Far less attention has been devoted to the 
conditions under which opposition parties win power. There are good reasons for this. 
Writing in this Journal in 2010, Cheeseman found that the electoral playing field was 
so unbalanced that incumbents won 88% of the elections that they contested - with 
transfers of power much more likely to occur in “open seat” polls in which sitting 
presidents are forced to give way to new candidates as a result of presidential term-
limits.8  
 
While this general pattern persists, Mahama’s loss in Ghana – and the previous 
defeat of sitting presidents in Nigeria and, for a week at least, Gambia – suggests 
that it is also becoming increasingly difficult for incumbents to retain power. Although 
Ghana is in some ways an outlier in Africa in terms of the number of changes of 
government that it has experienced, 9  the institutional and societal factors that 
undermined the NDC’s authority provide important insights into the challenges that 
many African presidents face. In particular, we argue that recent transfers of power 
have been driven by a combination of deteriorating economic conditions, opposition 
learning, increasingly robust electoral processes, and – magnifying the impact of 
these three – increasingly assertive voters.  
 
Taken together, these developments make for much more competitive elections but 
the outcome of this process is uncertain because it depends on the willingness of 
leaders to continue to play by democratic rules. When they do, as in Ghana and 
Nigeria’s most recent elections, the defeat of incumbents is likely to ensue. When 
they do not, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the 
result is not democratic reform but greater repression, as presidents seek to insulate 
themselves against the rising risk of defeat. In this way, the factors that account for 
recent opposition victories also help to explain the recent decline in the quality of civil 
liberties across much of the continent.10 
 
 
Economic Difficulties and Assertive Voters 
 
In the months preceding the 2016 elections, hand painted signs reading “no lights no 
votes” started to appear in parts of rural Ghana.11 Their emergence illustrates a key 
feature of the campaign: the way in which economic difficulties and increasingly 
assertive voters combined to undermine the ruling party’s grip on power. Ghana’s 
economy has grown fairly steadily over the last two decades, and GDP growth is 
projected to rise from 4.1% in 2015 to 5.4% in 2016. These trends fuelled popular 
expectations that the Mahama government found itself unable to meet after 
production problems in the oil sector, combined with low oil prices, resulted in lower 
government revenue than projected.12 Along with a series of power shortages, which 
highlighted the country’s infrastructural shortcomings and hampered economic 
activity, these developments undermined the capacity of the NDC government to 
generate jobs.  
 
Ordinary Ghanaians have keenly felt the impact of economic difficulties. High 
inflation has led to increases in the price of key goods by 16 to 18% in each of the 
last three years, eroding the real value of wages, while youth unemployment is 
currently estimated at 48%. Consequently, many young people have been unable to 
pursue their personal ambitions, and have been forced to stay living with their 
parents well into their adult years.  
 
Popular frustrations with economic hardship would not have altered the course of the 
election if Ghanaian voters conformed to an “ethnic census” model and simply turned 
out en masse for their ethnic representative/party. 13  Ashanti voters would have 
supported the NPP, which has historically represented their interests, while Ewe 
voters would have remained loyal to their leaders within the NDC, and the election 
would have been decided by ethnic arithmetic rather than the campaign. However, 
much like their counterparts in other African states, Ghanaian voters are more 
sophisticated than this. The “no lights no votes” signs that were carefully placed 
along roads so that they could be seen by travelling politicians were erected not in 
opposition areas, but in the Volta region – an NDC heartland. In this context, they 
were not so much a declaration of voting intentions as a demand for more responsive 
government from ruling party’s core social base.  
 
The message to ruling party leaders at both the constituency and national level was 
clear: votes cannot be taken for granted. Such public expression of discontent 
reflects three interrelated trends. First, successive transfers of power have inculcated 
the belief that poorly performing governments can be replaced. More specifically, the 
willingness of political elites to respect key democratic rules has helped to reduce the 
stakes of electoral contests, because losing parties believe that they will have an 
opportunity to win power again in the future. At the same time, the fact that political 
candidates are typically careful to eschew explicitly ethnic appeals, and couch their 
campaigns in terms of national level policy goals such as industrialization and jobs, 
has stymied the evolution of the kind of divisive winner-takes-all politics witnessed 
elsewhere on the continent.14 In turn, this has given Ghanaian voters of all stripes the 
space to be more critical of their own leaders.  
 
Second, voter expectations are changing. Indeed, in the context of a cumulative 
experience of competitive elections and relatively educated citizenry (with a literacy 
rate above 75%), 15  some studies have argued that a significant number of 
Ghanaians have abandoned clientelism in favour of an ‘evaluative’ approach to 
politics in which club goods such as health clinics are more important than private 
goods such as cash handouts.16 In contrast, others insist that clientelist politics 
remain dominant.17 Our research offers a revision to these positions: the lesson of 
the recent elections is not that evaluative behaviour has displaced clientelism, but 
that voters are increasingly inclined to an evaluative clientelism, which is shaped by 
rising expectations and enabled by a relatively robust electoral system.18  
 
As the authors found in a nationally representative survey of 2,700 Ghanaians 
conducted in December 2015, public attitudes towards vote-buying are highly 
permissive.19 Indeed, during the campaign a range of items were distributed by 
candidates and their support teams, including money, t-shirts, rubber boots, 
cutlasses, second-hand clothes and pre-paid electricity meters. However, while many 
Ghanaian voters demand small gifts as a basic requirement of entering into a 
conversation about supporting a given party, this is only the first part of a more 
complex negotiation and does not guarantee their support with gifts often considered 
as inadequate or belated. As a result, while the NDC gave out more money and gifts 
than the NPP, they still struggled to mobilise the support they had enjoyed in 
previous polls both within and beyond their strongholds.  
 
Third, an increasingly open and tolerant political atmosphere has made it easier for 
political parties and leaders to campaign in the heartlands of their rivals. Thus, 
seasoned political activists in Ho Central constituency recalled how opposition 
activists were forced to campaign “underground” or not at all during the campaign for 
the country’s “founding” multi-party election in 1992. By contrast, in 2016, NDC and 
NPP flags hung side-by-side throughout the town centre, while opposition activists 
openly campaigned for political change. This is not to overlook a number of violent 
incidents between rival supporters that speak to the ongoing tension between the two 
parties, but it is important to note that these episodes were typically brief and 
localised. 
 
Taken together, these developments have weakened the capacity of whichever party 
is in power to fully control the vote in its heartlands, generating an increasingly 
competitive political landscape that has rendered presidents more vulnerable to 
popular discontent. Although few countries have developed a political landscape that 
is as tolerant as Ghana’s, or have experienced as many transfers of power, similar 
trends have weakened the position of incumbent presidents in a number of other 
cases. In Nigeria for example, a deteriorating economic environment, the waning 
credibility of President Goodluck Jonathan, and the presence of a number of 
respected reformers in the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) helped to 
facilitate a transfer of power in 2015. In like manner, a period of economic decline in 
Gambia as a result of a drop in tourism and nearby Ebola outbreak, combined with 
the emergence of a credible opposition candidate in the form of businessman Adama 
Barrow, contributed to the defeat of President Yahya Jammeh – although he has yet 
to accept it. 
 
The defeats for Mahama, Jonathan, and Jammeh suggest that a significant 
proportion of the electorate decide how to vote on the basis of their perceptions of 
the economic performance and competence of the party in power. As Bratton et al 
have argued, based on Afrobarometer survey data from 18 countries, “would-be 
voters in Africa consider policy performance, especially the government's perceived 
handling of unemployment, inflation, and income distribution”. 20  Further survey 
research has found that the kind of voters most likely to vote on the basis of 
performance and the public good are those who live in urban areas,21 are more 
educated,22 and come from families that have experienced inter-ethnic marriage.23 If 
this is correct, the proportion of the electorate voting on the basis of the 
government’s record will grow in the future as levels of urbanization and education 
on the continent increase.  
 
However, it is important to recognize that this is unlikely to mean that voters will swap 
parties regularly with no consideration to partisan or ethnic ties. The Ghanaian 
experience suggests that individual’s overall perception of competence is itself 
shaped by their sense of a politician’s willingness to respond to their particular needs. 
Indeed, even in countries where ethnic identities are highly salient – such as Kenya – 
voting patterns stem from a politics of persuasion whereby citizens are encouraged 
to view their interests – and the country’s – as best served by co-ethnics.24 As a 
result, the politics of ethnicity and the politics of performance often bleed into one 
another, such that voters who are highly critical of the ruling party are not always 
prepared to vote for the alternative. Thus, leaders who take their supporters for 
granted are likely to suffer at the polls not because their supporters will necessarily 
switch to a rival, but because they may just stay home if their expectations are 
disappointed. 
 
 
Opposition Learning and Innovation 
 
President Mahama’s defeat did not only reflect economic difficulties. The NPP also 
ran a more effective campaign than in the past. Having lost two elections in a row, it 
was widely rumoured that Akufo Addo would face a leadership challenge should he 
fail again. 25  Taken together with the NPP’s limited confidence in the EC, and 
recognition that defeating an incumbent president would be particularly problematic, 
Akufo Addo’s allies pursued a process of party strengthening. Consequently, 
although the NPP was hampered by a lack of funds, having spent eight long years in 
opposition, it appears to have targeted its resources more effectively.  
 
This process took two forms: first, a more nuanced party message; second, new 
strategies of political mobilization and demobilisation. At the national level, the 
opposition made a number of grand promises, including a commitment to build one 
factory per district or constituency in order to industrialise the country, and the 
creation of an annual development fund of $1 million per district to meet local needs. 
These pledges, which committed the NPP to a level of expenditure that may prove 
impossible to deliver, were carefully targeted to compete with President Mahama’s 
claims to have completed “the most massive infrastructural development in the 
history of this country”. Thus, although the NDC was able to point to Ghc 3 billion 
worth of expenditure on major projects, including the completion of a number of 
regional and district hospitals, it was the NPP that made the most expansive 
promises about what it would do in power. 
 
Significantly, these pledges went hand-in-hand with a negative campaign that sought 
to emphasise the ruling party’s responsibility for the country’s economic malaise. In 
making this case, the NPP – which recruits many of its leaders from legal and 
economic elites – depicted NDC leaders as lacking the skills necessary to effect 
development, and argued that it was best placed to support the business sector. 
These claims were strengthened by a series of corruption scandals, some of which 
implicated the president and his closest allies.26 By consistently reinforcing the link 
between corruption, government waste, and the absence of funds to deal with key 
challenges such as poor roads and electricity shortages, the NPP was able to paint 
the government as the main cause of Ghana’s economic difficulties. In doing so, the 
opposition began to undermine public confidence in the ruling party: in our December 
2015 survey, just 44% of respondents reported trusting the president.27 
 
These national campaigns were supported by a ground campaign that emphasised 
different messages in different parts of the country. Having learnt the difficulty of 
converting committed NDC supporters in previous elections, the opposition carefully 
targeted its efforts. In NPP strongholds, such as Kumasi, the main challenge for the 
party was not to win over government supporters so much as to foster internal unity 
and boost turnout among an electorate whose partisan allegiance is clear but which 
does not always head to the polls.28 To this end, party leaders emphasised how 
much allied communities stood to gain from a transfer of power, pledging a wide 
range of benefits from small gifts to club goods such as health clinics.  
 
However, the NPP adopted a very different strategy in NDC strongholds where it 
relied on the development of a stronger party infrastructure. As Morrison has 
argued,29 one of most distinctive features of Ghanaian politics is the strong political 
traditions that the two main parties identify with, and the capacity of these parties to 
dominate the political landscape. In 2016, the NPP put its political networks in 
government heartlands to particularly good use, classifying and targeting voters so 
as to avoid wasting funds. First, in higher density areas in which many voters can be 
quickly contacted, an “advanced party” conducted door-to-door canvassing and 
localised meetings to determine the sentiments of households and communities. 
Those who were identified as committed NDC supporters were subsequently left 
alone, while those who appeared to be sympathetic to the NPP received follow-up 
meetings in which they were given small gifts such as party t-shirts in an effort to firm 
up their support. Faced with voters who fell somewhere in between these two poles, 
such as disgruntled NDC supporters, the NPP adopted a third approach, which 
emphasised a third choice: not to vote at all. Aware that former NDC supporters were 
unlikely to switch sides, opposition activists ran a negative campaign that 
emphasised the ruling party’s failings and encouraged its supporters to stay at home. 
 
Finally, in the country’s four “swing areas” in which there is strong support for both 
parties – Brong Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra and Western – the NPP pursued a 
combination of these two approaches, to the extent that it was possible to target 
voters in diverse locales. This trio of strategies appears to have been effective. While 
the NPP performed better in the NDC’s strongholds than it did in 2012, the most 
important development in these areas was that turnout fell dramatically, resulting in a 
drop in the number of votes for Mahama. For example, in Volta the number of votes 
secured by the NPP increased by 22,000 to 133,000, while support for the NDC fell 
by 121,000 to 613,205 – despite the expansion of the electoral register. Along with 
the NPP’s stronger performance in its own heartlands, 30  and the fact that the 
opposition overturned NDC majorities in all four swing states,31 this condemned 
Mahama to the worst electoral performance of any sitting president since the 
reintroduction of multiparty politics. 
 
The kind of opposition political learning and innovation that contributed to the ruling 
party’s defeat in Ghana has also underpinned transfers of power in a number of other 
countries. This is an important point, because the fragmentation of the opposition has 
been one of the factors that has hitherto enabled incumbents to maintain political 
hegemony. As Nicolas van de Walle and Kimberley Butler argued in 1999, the most 
common party system on the continent features a dominant ruling party and 
fragmented opposition.32 In the case of Ghana, the persistence of a two-party system 
has limited the extent of political fragmentation and so the main challenge for the 
NPP was to shore up internal party unity and find new ways to campaign outside of 
its home areas. But elsewhere on the continent, the task facing opposition parties 
has often been more taxing, and has involved complex processes of alliance 
formation.  
 
Although the construction of stable political coalitions has often failed as a result of a 
lack of trust between leaders, the absence of common ground, and weak party 
structures,33 there is evidence that successive defeats have encouraged opposition 
parties to take such processes more seriously. In Nigeria, for example, the creation 
of a relatively inclusive alliance of northern and southern leaders within the APC, and 
the ability of the new coalition to limit defections ahead of polling day, laid the 
foundations for Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential victory. Similarly, in the Gambia, it 
was the decision of a number of different factions to bury their differences and invest 
in the formation of a united front that undermined Jammeh’s grip on power. Given 
this, it may be time to revaluate our understanding of the capacity of opposition 
parties to adapt and organize – even in contexts where supportive institutions such 
as trade unions are absent.34 Political parties may still represent the “weakest link” in 
the chain of democratization,35 but they are not static and need not repeat their 
mistakes. 
   
 
Electoral Commission Institutionalization and New Technology 
 
The Ghanaian Electoral Commission has also undergone a process of institutional 
innovation and strengthening over the past twenty years. Following the controversy 
of the 1992 elections, when the NPP boycotted legislative polls in protest at the 
alleged rigging of the presidential vote, a process of steady reform has built 
opposition confidence in the electoral process. The EC’s credibility has had two main 
sources. First, the personal authority and calming influence of its long-standing 
(1993-2015) Chairman, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, who announced the first defeat of a 
ruling party in 2000. Second, the creation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee 
(IPAC) – an arena within which all of the main political parties are represented and 
can discuss their electoral concerns – which has enabled the EC to build consensus 
around a series of reforms such as the introduction of transparent ballot boxes and 
election technology. Taken together, these processes have not eliminated 
malpractice, but they have given rise to one of the most respected commissions on 
the continent.36 
 
However, despite its record of success, the EC went into the 2016 elections facing 
serious questions over its credibility. In 2012, the NPP filed a petition with the 
Supreme Court, challenging the election results and alleging multiple voting, the 
existence of “ghost” polling stations not on the official list and – crucially – the 
absence of relevant signatures on some forms. Even after the Supreme Court 
confirmed Mahama’s victory, the opposition continued to protest that the election had 
been fraudulent and that the 2016 polls would be rigged. Their fears were intensified 
when Afari-Gyan stood down in 2015 and was replaced by the former chairperson of 
the National Commission for Civic Education, Charlotte Osei, who was alleged to be 
a government ally. The combination of the controversy of the 2012 polls and Osei’s 
appointment weakened public confidence in the EC, to the extent that in December 
2015 only 24% of Ghanaians said that they trusted the body “a lot”, while 25% 
reported that they did not trust it “at all”.37 
 
The EC responded to these challenges as it had to similar criticisms in the past: by 
enacting reforms to counteract identified problems and using IPAC to build 
agreement between the rival parties. In total, the EC agreed to make 27 out of 29 
changes proposed by a Special Reform Committee set up to review the 2012 
controversy.38 As in that election, biometric registration and verification technology 
was used to try and improve the quality of the voters register and to reduce multiple 
voting. At the same time, there was a new requirement that physical copies of signed 
polling station and constituency level results be supplied to party agents. Perhaps 
most significantly, the EC continued to build up its cadre of regional and district 
election officers who see themselves as professionals and regard their work as a 
career. While the nuts and bolts of the process were handled by temporary staff, the 
managerial and supervisory presence of these bureaucrats encouraged confidence 
in the process at the constituency level. Despite NPP concerns about the alleged 
appointment of NDC supporters as returning officers, the combination of these 
measures resulted in a high quality election, which suggests that the EC has 
developed an institutional strength that is just as important as the personal authority 
of the Chairperson.39  
 
The NPP also changed the way in which it monitored the polls. Building on a strong 
network of activists in all parts of the country, the opposition developed an app that 
party agents at the polling station level could download onto their mobile phones and 
use to record and transmit both the result and a photograph of the signed verification 
form. As a result, the opposition was able to construct a parallel set of results that 
meant that party leaders were confident that they had won the presidency well before 
the Electoral Commission began releasing the official figures. Along with similar 
efforts by some media houses, this ensured that the NPP’s gains were widely 
publicised early on, which in turn increased the pressure on the Commission to 
declare the result, and on Mahama to stand down. 
 
Similar processes of electoral reform have also played an important role in enabling 
opposition victories in other countries. For example, in Nigeria the widely praised 
election that brought Buhari to power came just eight years after elections in 2007 
that were widely condemned as some of the worst ever seen on the continent. In-
between these two polls, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
strengthened both its independence and capacity – including the use of biometric 
registration and verification – under its well-respected Chairman, Attahiru Jega.  
 
However, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which incumbents are 
vulnerable to these trends, or the efficacy of election technology. The weak legal 
standing of most electoral commissioners in Africa, who tend to be appointed by and 
to serve at the pleasure of the president, means that it is often relatively 
straightforward for the ruling party to sustain a pliant electoral management body. 
Moreover, election technology has a mixed track record, and has typically only 
worked when there has been the necessary political will to put in place the 
infrastructure required to sustain it. Most notably, during the controversial Kenyan 
election of 2013, a new system for transmitting results via mobile phones failed 
completely, while in Nigeria many biometric verification machines could not be used 
on polling day, forcing polling officials to fall back on manual processes. Given this, it 
is important to keep in mind that neither electoral commission reform nor new 
technology represents a silver bullet for free and fair elections. 
 
 
Should I stay or should I go 
 
Taken together, economic downturn, assertive voters, stronger electoral 
commissions and opposition innovation has increased the pressure on incumbent 
presidents in many parts of the continent. However, these developments will not 
necessarily translate into more competitive elections and transfers of power. As 
Robert Dahl famously noted, 40  presidents have two choices when faced with 
mounting opposition: they may accede to pressure for reform, or they may decide to 
repress their rivals. When incumbents agree to reform, transfers of power become far 
more likely, as in Ghana and Nigeria. But where presidents respond through coercion, 
as in Burundi and Chad, hope of democratic consolidation is typically undermined by 
a period of autocratization. This point is important, because over the past decade 
African leaders faced with the prospect of imminent defeat have tended to choose 
repression over reform, leading to a decline in the quality of civil liberties and political 
rights on the continent.41 
 
Of course, the deployment of repression, which often takes the form of arresting rival 
leaders, clamping down on freedom of speech, refusing to permit opposition rallies, 
and the intimidation of civil society groups, is not always effective. In Burkina Faso, 
public hostility towards President Blaise Compaoré was so entrenched that when he 
attempted to change the constitution in 2014 to extend his 27 years in power, 
opposition leaders were able to mount an uprising that removed him from power. But 
Compaoré’s example is rare. More often than not, coercion has proved highly 
effective. Partly as a result, a majority of sub-Saharan African countries have never 
experienced a transfer of power via elections. Of course, there are a number of 
examples of countries with open political systems in which the ruling party continues 
to win because it is genuinely popular, such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. 
However, in more authoritarian contexts such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 
the opposition would likely have made a major breakthrough in the absence of 
repression and electoral manipulation.42  
 
Table 1 - Presidential Transfers of Power Through The Ballot Box in Africa 
Since 198943 
 Number (%) Cases 
No transfer of 
power via 
elections 
28 (61%)44 Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameron, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Brazzaville, Djibouti, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe. 
Transfer of power 
via elections 
18 (39%) Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Zambia. 
 
This raises an important question: under what conditions do leaders agree to step 
down? In previous research, Cheeseman has argued that presidents are most likely 
to pursue reform rather than repression when they lack secure access to economic 
resources, face a united opposition, enjoy limited international backing, and have no 
reason to fear that they or their allies will suffer a high economic or physical cost if 
they stand down. 45  The evidence of recent elections highlights the particular 
significance of the last of these factors. In Ghana, President Mahama’s defeat has 
resulted in a blow to his pride, but is unlikely to lead to him being prosecuted or 
persecuted by the new government. Instead, Ghanaian politicians have come to a 
consensus on an extremely generous “golden handshake” that protects the 
economic interests of losing candidates at the presidential and parliamentary level. 
Mahama therefore had little to fear from leaving office.46  
 
This stands in stark contrast with events in Gambia, where President Jammeh 
initially accepted defeat only to change his mind eight days later. Publicly, Jammeh 
has said that the reason for this u-turn was his growing belief that the election had 
been rigged. However, no evidence of electoral manipulation emerged during this 
period. What did change between Jammeh’s two assertions was a statement by 
Adama Barrow that he would prosecute the outgoing president for a range of crimes 
committed during his time in office within a year of taking power.47 Other softer 
options, such as allowing the president to go into exile, were explicitly rejected. Most 
notably, just two days before Jammeh’s u-turn, Fatoumata Jallow-Tambajang, one of 
the main architects of the opposition alliance, stated that “He can’t leave … Any day 
he tells us he wants to go abroad, then we say no.”48 Seen in this light, Jammeh’s 
about-face was driven not by a love of power for power’s sake, but by an instinct for 
self-preservation.  
 
The tumultuous events in the Gambia are instructive, because they demonstrate both 
the waning power of incumbency and the capacity of even defeated presidents to 
frustrate processes of political change when their personal safety is at stake. Along 
with victories for incumbent leaders in poor quality elections in Uganda and Zambia 
in 2016, Jammeh’s intransigence serves as an important reminder that, while the 
challenges facing presidents are growing in many countries, the power of 
incumbency remains formidable. 
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